Differently from previous studies of tag-based cooperation, we assume that individuals fail to recognize their own tag. Due to such incomplete information, the action taken against the opponent cannot be based on similarity, although it is still motivated by the tag displayed by the opponent. We present stability conditions for the case when individuals play unconditional cooperation, unconditional defection or conditional cooperation. We then consider the removal of one or two strategies. Results show that conditional cooperators are the most resilient agents against extinction and that the removal of unconditional cooperators may lead to the extinction of unconditional defectors.
Introduction
The emergence of cooperation has been widely studied in many branches of science [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] . In a well-mixed homogeneous population in which players select either to cooperate or defect, the prisoner's dilemma leads to the extinction of cooperation. Using the standard replicator dynamics, pure defection is the only asymptotically stable state, hence natural selection reduces the average fitness of the population [4] .
In [4] five mechanisms that may lead to cooperation are reviewed: (1) kin selection [7] in which donors and recipients of cooperation are genetically related, (2) direct reciprocity [8] such as in the iterated prisoner's dilemma with the use of the tit-for-tat strategy, (3) indirect reciprocity where individuals who cooperate are more likely to receive cooperation [9] , (4) reciprocity in networks and (5) group selection.
The use of punishment as in [6] may also lead to the extinction of defectors, although punishment is a form of reciprocity.
Cooperation can also emerge based on similarity. In [10, 11] a well-mixed population of heterogeneous individuals is modelled. In [10] heterogeneity stems from individuals having a tag and a tolerance threshold, both randomly drawn from a uniform distribution [0, 1] . Individual i cooperates with j as long as j's tag is similar enough to i's tag, i.e., |τ i − τ j | ≤ T i . Evolution is modelled numerically.
Differently from the iterated prisoner's dilemma, the same pair of players is unlikely to meet again.
In [11] the same problem is analytically modelled using only two tags and two forms of cooperation (unconditional cooperators and conditional cooperators, i.e., cooperate if the opponent displays the same tag), which combined lead to four strategies. In [12] unconditional defectors are also considered.
In such models all individuals can see the opponents' tags as well as they know their own tag.
In an experiment carried out by [13] with domestic fowls, an alternative form of discrimination is induced by tags. Two types of individuals are generated by artificially marking a given proportion of fowls on the back of their necks. Individuals are unable to identify their own type (whether they have a mark or not) but observe their opponent's type. Marked fowls suffer more aggression and have less body mass than their unmarked pen mates. The aggressiveness towards the other individuals is motivated by their type, but is not based on similarity. A theoretical model of such experiment using a hawk-dove game is proposed in [14] . They obtain two evolutionarily stable strategies (one in which the marked individuals are discriminated, the other in which the unmarked individuals are discriminated). Of the two evolutionarily stable strategies only one is relevant in the experiment, as negative discrimination is associated with marks.
In human societies discrimination is associated with race, gender or physical appearance. In particular it is well known that there exists some "beauty premium", which has been tested in laboratory. In [15] , before playing the prisoner's dilemma, subjects are asked whether they want to play once they have seen their potential partner. Results indicate that subjects are more likely to enter play and to cooperate with others they find attractive. In [16] attractive subjects gain a "beauty premium" when playing the trust game. They are trusted at higher rates (and as a consequence they earn more). The influence of physical attractiveness has also been investigated in the ultimatum game. [17] observes that one's own attractiveness does not influence the decision-making. The partner's attractiveness, however, matters: more is offered to attractive people, even though attractive people do not demand more. [18] explores beauty in a public goods experiment and find a "beauty premium", even though beautiful people contribute, on average, no more or less than others.
In this paper the emergence of discriminative cooperation is studied. As in [11] , individuals are assigned one of two types. By contrast individuals cannot condition their strategy on their own type as they fail to recognize it. Still they can choose a different action for the two types of opponent. This leads to four possible pure strategies: cooperate (defect) against both types and cooperate (defect) against the first type and defect (cooperate) against the second type. The first two strategies are nondiscriminating: individuals are programmed to play the same action against any type of opponent, while the last two are discriminating. Thus individuals playing non-discriminating strategies are either unconditional cooperators or unconditional defectors while individuals playing discriminating strategies are conditional cooperators. Another difference with [11] is that here new offspring are randomly assigned their type in such a way that the proportion of each type in the population is kept constant over time.
The allocation of type is thus completely independent of the strategy an offspring is programmed to play.
Hence, offspring inherit strategies but not types. Also, we use standard replicator dynamics, eliminating the probability of mutations happening. The latter is similar to the replicator in [11] without the drift towards cooperation. In particular we eliminate from the dynamics the so-called "tides of tolerance" (also found in [10] ).
We start with the case when all four strategies are available within the population. We then consider the effect of removing one pure strategy. The motivation for removing strategies can be found in the experiments, where types have a positive or negative connotation. In this case it seems reasonable to assume that no player uses the strategy that consists of using the positive action toward the negative type and the negative action toward the positive type. For instance in [14] the strategy hawk against the unmarked type and dove against the marked type should be removed in the hawk-dove game. Similarly the strategy "defect against the attractive individual and cooperate with the non attractive individual" may be removed. For the sake of completeness we consider the removal of any possible strategy as well as the removal of two strategies.
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents the snowdrift game for the heterogeneous population with all four pure strategies available in the population. In Section 3 the analysis is extended to the game when one strategy is removed from the population at the initial conditions and we compare our results with those of the snowdrift game played by a homogeneous population as well as those of previous studies on similarity-based cooperation. In Section 4 a second strategy is suppressed. Section 5 concludes.
Evolutionary snowdrift game with heterogeneous population
Two individuals have to choose among two actions, cooperate (C) or defect (D). Following [2] or [19] the game payoff matrix is given by:
where b is the benefit of cooperation, c its cost. In the prisoner's dilemma the cost of cooperation is larger than the benefit: b < c, and defect is always a dominant strategy. Still both individuals are better off if both cooperate than if both defect: c < 2b. In the snowdrift game 1 the benefit of cooperation is larger than its cost, b > c. If an individual cooperates with probability α while her opponent cooperates 1 The results obtained in the paper can be easily extended to the whole class of symmetric anti-coordination games, i.e. 21 . Here a 12 < a 11 also holds (an individual gets more if both cooperate than if she cooperates while her opponent defects).
3 with probability β the individual's expected payoff is given by u(α, β) with
An individual's best response is to cooperate if the opponent cooperates with probability β < a, to defect if β > a and is indifferent between defection and cooperation if β = a. The equilibrium is when both individuals cooperate with probability a (0 < a < 1).
Cooperation at equilibrium has a larger probability than defection (a > 1/2) if the benefit of cooperation is relatively large with respect to its cost, i.e., if b > (3/2)c. We will refer to large benefits of cooperation if b > (3/2)c and small benefits of cooperation if b < (3/2)c.
Consider a very large well-mixed population with bilateral encounters between individuals programmed to play pure strategies (cooperate or defect) in the snowdrift game. In this homogeneous population there is one asymptotically stable state where the proportion of cooperators (i.e., the frequency with which cooperation emerges) equals a. Now assume that the population is heterogeneous: it is composed of two different types of individuals, type-I and type-II. The proportion of type-I individuals is fixed over time and equals to x. Both types of individuals exist (0 < x < 1) and one type is more numerous than the other:
. Given the very large population, at any bilateral encounter between two individuals the probabilities of the four possible encounters can be written as
A strategy is denoted α=(α I , α II ) where α I is the probability of cooperating when the opponent is of type-I, α II is the probability of cooperating when the opponent is of type-II. There are four pure strategies (1, 1), (1, 0), (0, 1), and (0, 0) that we respectively denote CC, CD, DC, and DD. Generic pure strategies will be denoted by i, j. A strategy is non-discriminating if α I = α II (as pure strategies CC and DD) discriminating if α I ̸ = α II (as pure strategies CD and DC). Hence, unconditional cooperators (defectors) play CC (DD) while conditional cooperators play either CD or DC.
The expected payoff of an individual playing α while the opponent plays β = (β I , β II ) is the sum of the expected payoffs she would obtain in every possible encounter weighted by its probability of occurrence. Therefore the expected payoff of an individual playing α against an opponent playing β,
Using (2) and (3) the previous expression can be rewritten as
Note the similarity between (2) and (4): the probability of cooperation (α or β) is substituted by the frequency of cooperation (
Now consider that the population is divided into four subgroups; in each subgroup a pure strategy is played. A possible state of the population is denoted θ = (θ CC , θ CD , θ DC , θ DD ). It gives the proportions of the population using each pure strategy i. As 0 ≤ θ i ≤ 1 and θ CC + θ CD + θ DC + θ DD = 1, the phase space is a tetrahedron in ℜ 3 (see Figure 1) . A state is monomorphic if all population uses one single strategy: θ i = 1 for some strategy i (vertices of the tetrahedron). Otherwise the state is polymorphic.
In state θ cooperation occurs with frequency θ CC + θ CD if the opponent is of type-I, and with frequency θ CC + θ DC if the opponent is of type-II. Indeed those who play CC and those who play CD cooperate when facing an opponent of type-I. For an individual it is as if the opponent was playing
The increase in the proportion of individuals playing pure strategy i is proportional to the payoff gain of the strategy. The population dynamics is governed by replicator dynamics:
This can be rewritten using (4) aṡ
where Ψ θ is the frequency of cooperation in state θ:
The frequency of cooperation for pure strategies is 1 if all individuals are unconditional cooperators (Ψ CC = 1), it is 0 if all individuals are unconditional defectors (Ψ DD = 0), and it is equal to x or 1 − x for conditional cooperators (Ψ CD = x and Ψ DC = 1 − x).
Throughout the paper, we focus the analysis on cases where the non-linear system of ordinary differential equations given by (5-8) is hyperbolic at all θ corresponding to a monomorphic population. The following theorem tells us that in the long run, the population evolves to a neutrally stable state θ with a frequency of cooperation equal to a, as in the homogeneous game.
Theorem 1 When all pure strategies are played (1) no monomorphic state is stable, (2) all states θ
with Ψ θ = a are neutrally stable.
Stability of the critical points is investigated by standard linearization (proof is given in the Appendix). Geometrically the (neutrally) stable states are located on a plane π with equation θ CC + xθ CD + (1 − x)θ DC = a that crosses the tetrahedron. Plane π divides the tetrahedron into two subspaces, T 1 (where Ψ θ > a holds) and T 2 (where Ψ θ < a). From any point located within any of these subspaces the vector field flows towards the stationary states located on plane π. Thus, in the long run (t → ∞), the population evolves to a particular neutrally stable state θ which depends on the initial condition θ 0 . At the neutrally stable states all strategies generally survive.
Using (4), the evolution of the frequency of cooperation can be seen from the difference in expected payoffs:
When Ψ θ < a (equivalently, for any θ ∈ T 2 ) cooperation against all individuals is always the best performing strategy (U (CC, β θ ) > U (i, β θ ) for any i ̸ = CC), and defect against all individuals the worst performing strategy (U (DD, β θ ) < U (i, β θ ) for any i ̸ = DD). The frequency of cooperation increases in the population over time. When Ψ θ > a (equivalently, for any θ ∈ T 1 ) defecting against all individuals is the fittest strategy and increases its proportion over time, while cooperation against all individuals is the worst performing strategy. The fittest strategy is always one of the non-discriminating strategies but none of them is dominant because they only perform the best when few individuals have adopted them. Once many individuals have adopted a non-discriminating strategy, this strategy always becomes the worst performing one, and the proportion of individuals adopting it decreases over time. The only condition leading to a stable stationary state is when Ψ θ = a and a polymorphic neutrally stable state holds. Theorem 1, although neutral stability always holds when all strategies are available, the removal of one strategy may lead to asymptotic stability depending on the position of the plane crossing the interior of the tetrahedron. Either three or four faces of the latter are always crossed by π (see Figure 1) . As long as all faces are intercepted, neutral stability holds when one strategy is removed. When only three faces are crossed by π, there is room for asymptotic stability as long as θ i = 0 leads to a state θ located on the face that is not crossed by π. The position of π in ℜ 3 can be described by its normal vector 6 n and the critical point (a, 0, 0) (see proof of Theorem 1). The direction of n depends on the degree of heterogeneity of the population (distribution of types in the population x and 1 − x). Also, given that π always passes through (a, 0, 0), a necessary condition for asymptotic stability is the removal of a non-discriminating strategy. This is carefully investigated in the next section. 
Extinction of one strategy
If a social norm prevents individuals from using a particular strategy what is the evolutionary pattern of the population? That is, what is the result of removing one strategy from the set of strategies, i.e., θ i = 0 at the initial conditions? A first result is that when a discriminating strategy is removed, the population evolves to a neutrally stable state with the same frequency of cooperation as in the game played by a homogeneous population or as in the game played by a heterogeneous population when all four strategies are available. The proof of the following theorem is given in the Appendix. Asymptotic stability can never be attained when one discriminating strategy is removed. The population evolves to a weak (neutrally) stable stationary state, susceptible to shocks (system disturbances)
that move the population away from it to an alternative stationary state close enough to ensure neutral stability. Still asymptotic stability is violated. The frequency of cooperation at any neutrally stable 7 state is the same as in the homogeneous game. We illustrate in Figure 2 the vector field when θ CD = 0.
As θ DD = 1 − θ CC − θ DC we can draw the figure in the plane (θ CC , θ DC ). The thick solid straight line crossing the interior of the phase space is the set of neutrally stable states θ ∈ π. Its intersections with the boundaries of the phase space are {(a, 0), ( Summarizing the relation between benefits of cooperation, distribution of types and asymptotic stability, close to the boundary between large and small benefits of cooperation (a close to 1/2), asymptotic stability can be attained only with a more heterogeneous population (i.e., the distribution of types,
x and 1 − x, cannot be too unequal) while when we have either very small or very large benefits of cooperation (a close to either 0 or 1, respectively), asymptotic stability may also be achieved with an almost homogeneous population (x close to either 0 or 1). In terms of the topology of the phase space (see Figure 1) , the conditions for asymptotic stability require that π has normal vector n = (1,
with direction such that π crosses the tetrahedron through points (a, 0, 0), (0, (Theorem 3) . When a discriminating strategy is removed from the population, one can see from (10) that the remaining discriminating strategy is always less fit than one of the non-discriminating strategies. In line with the discussion in Section 2, the fittest strategy is always one of the non-discriminating strategies but none of them is dominant because they only perform the best when few individuals have adopted them. Again asymptotic stability cannot be attained and the population evolves to a neutrally stable state in which all strategies available in the population generally survive.
By contrast, when a non-discriminating strategy is removed, a discriminating strategy can be fit enough to drive the other strategies to extinction. Let us illustrate this when θ CC = 0. From (10), first consider that Ψ θ < a. Strategy DD performs the worst, DC becomes the fittest strategy for small proportion of individuals of type-I (i.e., for x < 1 2 ) while CD becomes the fittest strategy for x > 1 2 . Moreover from (6) we can obtainθ CD = 0 for Ψ θ = Ψ CD = x. Also Ψ θ = x > 1 2 is compatible with Ψ θ < a for large benefits of cooperation (a > 1 2 ). Note that in this case the frequency of cooperation is x, which is smaller than a, the frequency of cooperation in the homogeneous game, but always larger than 1/2. Similarly from (7) we can obtainθ DC = 0 for Ψ θ = Ψ DC = 1−x. Then Ψ θ = 1−x > 1 2 is compatible with Ψ θ < a for large benefits of cooperation (a > 1 2 ). Note that in this case the frequency of cooperation is 1 − x, again smaller than a but larger than 1 2 . In sum, removing unconditional cooperators leads to the extinction of unconditional defectors under the conditions stated in Theorem 3. Still, independently of the asymptotically stable state (be it CD or DC), cooperation is less frequent than in the homogeneous snowdrift game, although cooperation emerges always with a frequency larger than 1 2 . This contrasts with the results found in [10] . In the latter, also for large benefits of cooperation, although the frequency of cooperation is 74% for 
Extinction of a second strategy
When a second strategy is removed, only discriminating strategies are able to survive alone and take over the entire population. The following theorem shows that monomorphic states are not stable when only non-discriminating strategies are available:
Theorem 5 When θ CD = 0 and θ DC = 0 the only asymptotically stable state is polymorphic with
Note that at the asymptotically stable state the frequency of cooperation is Ψ θ = a. In contrast, when only discriminating strategies are available, monomorphic and polymorphic states can be stable.
The stability conditions are given in the next theorem:
Theorem 6
If θ CC = 0 and θ DD = 0, (1) a monomorphic state with discriminating strategy is asymptotically stable for min{a, 1−a} < x < max{a, 1−a} (2) a polymorphic state (θ CD , θ DC ) = (
The last result is when we have one non-discriminating strategy and one discriminating strategy.
In this case either the discriminating strategy takes over the population or an asymptotically stable For all asymptotically stable points in Theorems 5, 6 and 7, the frequency of cooperation equals (differs from) that of the homogeneous snowdrift game whenever asymptotic stability corresponds to a polymorphic (monomorphic) population. Differently from Theorems 3 and 4, the existence of asymptotic stability associated with a monomorphic population is not conditional on the size of the benefit of cooperation.
Conclusion
In this paper, we have studied how frequent cooperation emerges in the context of a snowdrift game played by a heterogeneous population composed of two types of players and incomplete information with regard to players' own type. When all four strategies are available the dynamics leads to a set of neutrally stable critical points in which all strategies generally survive. If a discriminating strategy is removed, neutral stability remains. By contrast if it is a non-discriminating strategy, asymptotic stability can be achieved. When asymptotic stability holds, it is always for a monomorphic state with a discriminating strategy, implying the extinction of both unconditional cooperators and defectors. The stable discriminating strategy is either defect against the less numerous group for large benefits of cooperation or defect against the more numerous group for small benefits of cooperation. Frequency of cooperation however differs from the one obtained in the game played by a homogeneous population. For small (large) benefits of cooperation, cooperation emerges at a frequency lower (greater) than 1 2 , however more (less) often than in the homogeneous population case. When a second strategy is removed, the result that only discriminating strategies are able to survive alone still holds. Two direct consequences of such results are the following. First, by removing all unconditional cooperators from the population, the extinction of unconditional defectors can be achieved (and vice-versa) under specific conditions leading to a monomorphic population of only conditional cooperator individuals. Second, conditional cooperators are more resilient against extinction than individuals who do not discriminate.
One possible extension of the model includes a polarized structured population. In our model, we assumed a well-mixed heterogeneous population which was polarized by type, i.e., individuals displayed one of two possible tags, type-I or type-II, and individuals were programmed to play different strategies.
In the evolutionary game, a well-mixed population means that each individual can play the game against any randomly chosen opponent, independently of where the latter is spatially located in the population.
Alternatively, individuals can be randomly located among the sites of a lattice and can only interact with their nearest neighbors. This population spatial structure can be modelled using the model of regular solutions (Bragg-Williams) applied to binary alloys as in [20] [21] [22] .
In binary alloys, the model of regular solutions investigates the solubility of two atoms (two types of individuals, type-I and type-II). A mixture (population) is homogeneous when the latter are intermixed on a atomic scale to form a single phase, as in a solution, or the mixture is heterogeneous when it contains distinct phases, i.e., the mixture exhibits a solubility gap. Any system at a fixed temperature evolves to the configuration of minimum free energy. Thus, depending on the system enthalpy, type-I and type-II individuals either dissolve in each other to form a homogeneous mixture (well-mixed heterogeneous population) or type-I and type-II individuals form instead a heterogeneous mixture (a spatially segregated population; each area in space composed almost only of one type of individual) if, 13 in the latter case, the combined free energy of the two separate phases is lower than the free energy of the homogeneous mixture [23] . If, additionally, only one strategy is played as in the case of asymptotic stability in Theorems 3 and 4, solubility gap would imply the emergence of a cluster of cooperation and a cluster of defection. This result is similar to one of the cases obtained in [24] where an island of cooperators emerges using an agent-based model but with the game modelled as a prisoner's dilemma and non-tagged individuals. A more precise analysis is left for further research.
Appendix
In order to find the stable states, we start by looking for the critical points of the system of equations (5) (6) (7) (8) . Then the eigenvalues of the Jacobian matrix (evaluated at the critical points) are computed.
Given that in our model the eigenvalues of the Jacobian matrix are always real numbers, the condition for asymptotic stability is that the eigenvalues are all negative. The entries of the Jacobian matrix are has normal vector n = (1, x, 1 − x). Using (11), the Jacobian matrix Ω(θ) that we evaluate at the isolated critical points is
14 and
The eigenvalues of Ω(θ), evaluated at the isolated critical points, λ θ = {λ and T 2 such that (1, 0, 0) ∈ T 1 and (0, 0, 0) ∈ T 2 . Thus the vector field flows from these two sources, (0, 0, 0) and (1, 0, 0), towards the stationary states θ ∈ π. When the system is at a given stationary state θ ∈ π, any small disturbance would move the system away from state θ towards another state θ ∈ π, close enough to ensure neutral stability.
Proof of Theorem 2. First consider that strategy θ CD = 0. The population dynamics is governed by equations (5) and (7) and the frequency of cooperation (9) stability is achieved for θ such that Ψ θ = a. Indeed the set of neutrally stable states always divides the phase space into two regions with θ CC = 1 in one region and θ DD = 1 in the other. Therefore the vector field flows from these two sources towards stationary states θ such that Ψ θ = a. When θ DC = 0, the dynamics is similar: we also obtain that neutral stability is achieved for all θ such that Ψ θ = a.
Proof of Theorems 3 and 4.
First consider that θ CC = 0. The population dynamics is governed by (6) and (7) and the frequency of cooperation (9) When the benefits of cooperation are small (a < 1/2) we obtain that (1, 0) is unstable, (0, 1) is asymptotically stable for a < x < 1/2 and (0, 0) is asymptotically stable when 1/2 < x < 1 − a. When the benefits of cooperation are large, (1, 0) is unstable while (0, 1) and (0, 0) are unstable or saddle points.
All states θ with Ψ θ = a are neutrally stable if there is no asymptotically stable state.
